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SUMMARY
The ability to learn not only from experienced but
also from merely fictive outcomes without direct
rewarding or punishing consequences should
improve learning and resulting value-guided choice.
Using an instrumental learning task in combination
with multiple single-trial regression of predictions
derived from a computational reinforcement-learning
model onhumanEEG,we foundanearly temporospa-
tialdoubledissociation in theprocessingoffictiveand
real feedback. Thereafter, real and fictive feedback
processing converged at a common final path, re-
flected in parietal EEG activity that was predictive of
future choices. In the choice phase, similar parietal
EEG activity related to certainty of the impending
response was predictive for the decision on the next
trial as well. These parietal EEG effects may reflect a
common adaptive cortical mechanism of updating
or strengtheningof stimulus valuesby integratingout-
comes, learning rate, and certainty, which is active
duringbothdecisionmakingandevaluation.Neuronal
processing of real (rewarding, punishing) and fictive
action outcomes (which would have happened had
one acted differently) differs for 400ms and then con-
verges on a common adaptive mechanism driving
future decision making and learning.
INTRODUCTION
Wouldn’t it be nice to know what would have happened if you
had chosen differently? Imagine driving on a highway toward a
traffic jam faced with two choices: bypass the highway or wait
in the hold up. Neither of the cases provides information about
which decision really yields the better result. On the other
hand, when choosing between two lanes in a traffic jam, you
will always notice the progress you are making in your lane and
the progress you could have been making in the other lane.
Both humans (Burke et al., 2010) and monkeys (Subiaul et al.,
2004) share the ability to learn complex rules and values from
watching the actions of other conspecifics—termed vicarious
or observational learning. This capability provides evolutionary
benefits by reducing trial and error learning costs and can be
speculated to be the progenitor of more abstract, counterfactual
reasoning in humans. In reinforcement-learning models, it has
been theorized that learning can be based on results from
unchosen options as well (Sutton and Barto, 1998). Although
the neural implementation of counterfactual learning recently
sparked considerable interest (Boorman et al., 2011), little is
known about its exact timing—particularly with regard to the
processing of fictive prediction errors (PEs) (Chiu et al., 2008;
Lohrenz et al., 2007) and their neural realization in the absence
of other actors (de Bruijn et al., 2009).
To study the temporospatial evolution of cortical brain activity
during learning from real and fictive outcomes and behavioral
choice based on the learned stimulus values, we used a proba-
bilistic reinforcement-learning task while recording electroen-
cephalogram (EEG). Subjects decided to either choose or avoid
gambling following one centrally presented stimulus in every trial
(Figure 1A). A chosen gamble resulted in amonetary gain or loss,
depending on the reward contingency associated with that stim-
ulus. In choosing not to gamble, subjects avoided financial con-
sequences, yet still observed what would have happened if they
had chosen to gamble. Although neither directly rewarding or
punishing, fictive outcomes can be used in the same way as
real outcomes to update learned estimated values of given stim-
uli and determine whether behavioral adjustments are needed.
Notably, the subjective valence of the feedback reverses after
avoiding a gamble: a fictive and thus foregone reward (reflected
in a positive PE in our computational reinforcement learning
model, see Experimental Procedures and further below) is unfa-
vorable, and a fictive and thus avoided loss (reflected in a nega-
tive PE) is favorable (Figure 1B). Good, bad, and neutral stimuli
were presented; their valence was reflected in reward probabil-
ities above, below, or at chance level, respectively. By learning
which symbols to choose and which to avoid, subjects could
maximize their earnings.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Behavior and Computational Model
Subjects learned avoiding bad and choosing good stimuli
comparably well: we observed no difference in the absolute
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number of correct decisions following good compared to bad
stimuli (t30 = 1.31, p = 0.20). Additionally, median reaction times
did not differ between conditions (t30 = 0.43, p = 0.67). Learning
of choice behavior for good and bad stimuli followed a logarith-
mic curve approaching an asymptote reflecting the probabilistic
outcome of the respective stimuli (Figure 1C). This supports the
notion that the weight of reward PEs in value updating decreases
in an exponential fashion.
To derive single-trial estimates of individual PEs and subjec-
tive stimulus values, we fit a Q-learning model (see Experimental
Procedures) (Jocham et al., 2009; Sutton and Barto, 1998; Wat-
kins and Dayan, 1992) to each subject’s sequence of choices. To
account for the observed decrease in learning, we implemented
an exponentially decreasing half-life time as a freemodel param-
eter that reduces the learning rate in later trials providing single-
trial estimates of the learning rate (at). Maximum likelihood
estimated (MLE) learning parameters of the model did not differ
for learning from real and fictive outcomes (Table 1), indicating
that subjects could utilize both sources of information with
similar efficiency. This is also supported by the fact that sensi-
tivity to misleading probabilistic feedback did not differ signifi-
cantly between real and fictive conditions (Supplemental Infor-
mation available online). MLEs of the half-life time indicated an
average decrease of at of more than 90% in both conditions
per block. Additionally, negative log-likelihood (LL) did not
differ when compared between good and bad stimuli.
Early Dissociation of Feedback Processing
Submitting feedback-locked EEG epochs to multiple robust
regression analysis (Cohen and Cavanagh, 2011; O’Leary,
1990; Rousselet et al., 2008) revealed a double dissociation of
cortical PE correlates between real and fictive outcomes in the
first 400 ms following feedback. Intriguingly, the first significant
covariation of feedback-locked EEG activity with PEs was found
exclusively for fictive outcomes: a negative early occipital effect
occurred 192–238 ms after feedback (Figure 2A and Movie S1)
andwas localized to extrastriate visual and posteromedial cortex
(PMC; Figure S2A). In contrast, only real outcomes were associ-
ated with a somewhat later positive early PE effect spanning
from 236–294 ms and a subsequent negative midlatency frontal
Figure 1. Experimental Design, Modeled and Observed Behavior
(A) Time course of the learning task. Choosing to gamble following stimulus presentation leads to real feedback consisting of a win or loss of 0.10V. Avoiding the
gamble leads to fictive feedback without financial consequences but still provides information about the outcome of the trial.
(B) Task structure separated by subjects’ choices. Note that the sign of the PE reverses in relation to the subjective outcome depending on the choice made.
(C) Modeled and observed behavior. Learning curves for empiric behavior of all subjects (symbols, ±SE) and predictions of the computational model (solid lines in
the same color) for good, bad, and neutral symbols. Learning curves were comparable in both conditions and approached asymptotically toward their final levels.
See Figure S1.
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PE covariation at 336–430 ms, which in the averaged event-
related potentials (ERPs) give rise to the feedback-related nega-
tivity (FRN) and P3a components, respectively (Figure 3). Direct
contrasts between both conditions showed significant differ-
ences at electrode Oz during the time window of the occipital
PE effect (peak t30 =4.18, 204 ms, p < 0.0005) and at electrode
FCz during FRN (peak t30 = 4.95, 284 ms, p < 10
4), as well as
P3a time windows (peak t30 = 7.95, 394 ms, p < 108) (Fig-
ure 4B). The temporospatial double dissociation in early pro-
cessing of real and fictive feedback was statistically confirmed
by a triple interaction of the factors electrode, time window,
and condition in an ANOVA on the average regression weights
of the early PE effects in significant time windows (190–240 ms
and 250–300 ms, for fictive and real feedback, respectively) at
the most significant electrodes (Oz and FCz, for fictive and real
feedback, respectively).
The FRN is usually found on unfavorable outcomes that violate
expectancies (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Miltner et al.,
1997). Our findings are consistent with an influential theory
proposing that the FRN reflects PE signals (Holroyd and Coles,
2002; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004). The negative polarity of the
FRN is in accordance with a positive covariation, as unfavorable
real outcomes cause negative PE values. It has been consis-
tently localized to the posterior medial frontal cortex (pMFC)
(Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Gruendler et al., 2011; Miltner
et al., 1997), which has been supported by fMRI findings on feed-
back processing (Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Ullsperger and von
Cramon, 2003). The subsequent pronounced negative midla-
tency frontal PE effect fits well with theories relating the P3a to
the recruitment of attention (Polich, 2007), which is here caused
by negative PEs leading to a negative covariation by instigating
increased P3a amplitudes. Exploratory localization analysis
suggests a source network in cingulate gyrus and orbitofrontal
cortices (Figure S2B).
In stark contrast to the real feedback condition associated
with the well-known pattern reflecting FRN and P3a, following
fictive feedback, these early and midlatency frontal PE effects
were conspicuously absent; the average ERP waveforms
showed merely a small negative deflection in the FRN time win-
dow that was unmodulated by learning parameters (Figures 3
and 4A). Feedback-related pMFC activity has been proposed
to reflect action value updating (Amiez et al., 2006; Jocham
et al., 2009; Kennerley et al., 2006; Walton et al., 2004). This sug-
gests that a previous action is required in order to involve pMFC
in the rapid processing of expectancy violations. The absence of
an FRN-like PE effect on fictive outcomes could be explained in
two ways: avoiding a stimulus is interpreted as abstaining from
an action, or the neutral monetary outcome does not yield the
necessary PE signal required for credit assignment to avoiding.
The latter explanation seems very unlikely as other cortical PE
correlates were found for fictive outcomes and MLE learning pa-
rameters in our task do not differ between conditions. It is also
unlikely that the missing FRN results from reduced expectancy
of and attention to fictive outcomes, because behavioral and
modeling data as well as later EEG effects (see below) suggest
similar utilization of fictive and real feedback. The absence of
the FRN on fictive outcomes seems at odds with studies report-
ing FRN-like EEG deflections and pMFC activity on observed
errors and feedback to others’ actions (de Bruijn et al., 2009;
van Schie et al., 2004; Yu and Zhou, 2006). Yet, in contrast to
abstaining from choosing a stimulus in our experiment,
observing actions could also lead to action simulation effects
in motor-related areas via mirror systems (Rizzolatti et al.,
2001)—permitting an update of action values. Taken together,
it appears most likely that for motor-related areas, such as the
pMFC, avoiding a stimulus in our learning task is equivalent to
not performing any motor action.
However, the absence of the FRN and P3a modulation by
fictive PEs does by no means indicate that outcomes are not
processed in the fictive task condition. In sharp contrast to real
feedback, we observed an early occipital PE-related EEG
modulation following fictive feedbacks that even precedes the
FRN time window, which has previously been interpreted as
the fastest cortical correlate of feedback processing (Gehring
and Willoughby, 2002; Philiastides et al., 2010). Its very short
latency and localization to extrastriate visual areas and PMC
(Figure S2A) seem to suggest that fictive outcomes engage a
specific mechanism that might ease counterfactual learning.
Although EEG does not allow precise localization, the found
source fits well with findings from fMRI studies in which PMC
has been associated with tracking values and PE signals of alter-
native unchosen options coding a counterfactual PE (Boorman
et al., 2011). In monkeys (Leichnetz, 2001) and humans (Mars
et al., 2011), the PMC is intensely interconnected with the
more lateral part of the parietal cortex that has been shown to
code fictive PE signals defined as the value difference between
outcomes that could have been attained by optimal investments
and actually attained outcomes (Chiu et al., 2008; Lohrenz et al.,
2007). Furthermore, afferent projections from the basal forebrain
as well as reciprocal projections with the anterior cingulate cor-
tex shown in macaques (Parvizi et al., 2006) permit a role of the
PMC in value processing and a causal role in choice behavior
has been shown by microstimulation of this region in monkeys
that leads to behavioral adaptation (Hayden et al., 2008). Addi-
tionally, the PMC has been suggested as part of a network
tracking evidence for future adaptations to pending options
(Boorman et al., 2011) in humans. Importantly, our results
presented here differ from these previous findings, since we
describe how the same stimulus value representation is updated
by different signals depending only on whether feedback was
Table 1. MLE Parameter and Model Fit
Parameter Real (SE) Fictive (SE) p for Difference
a1 0.484 (0.068) 0.421 (0.065) 0.497
Hl 9.781 (2.606) 13.467 (3.309) 0.403
b 10.356 10.356 –
Neither the initial learning rate a1 nor the half-life time Hl differed signifi-
cantly when estimated for real and fictive outcomes separately. The
sensitivity parameter b was kept the same for both conditions to ensure
that models were comparable. LL showed significantly lower values for
both good (69.363) and bad (63.284) compared to neutral stimuli
(116.641; difference: t30 > 8.7, p < 10
7 for both), while no difference be-
tween good and bad was observed (t30 = 1.23, p = 0.229). Therefore, our
model was equally effective in describing subjects’ behavior for good and
bad symbols, yet less effective for neutral ones.
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fictive or real. We suggest that this signal might reflect a process
that converts fictive outcomes to subjective value signals (Gold
and Shadlen, 2007), effectively facilitating counterfactual
learning that can more easily guide subsequent decisions.
This fictive PE effect cannot be interpreted as a surprise signal
(Ferdinand et al., 2012), as it was unaffected when outcome and
surprise, measured as the absolute PE value, were included into
the same regression model (Figures S3E and S3F). Additionally,
the effect cannot be interpreted as a consequence of repetition
suppression (Summerfield et al., 2008), as it would then be
expected to also occur following real feedback. In order to further
disentangle contributing factors of the different PE correlates, we
decomposed the PE into its components—the outcome and the
expected value—and submitted both to the same multiple
regression analysis. This revealed that the FRN in fact codes a
PE signal, as both outcome and expected value showed signifi-
cant effects with opposite signs indicating that the error signal
increasedwhen an unfavorable outcomewas less expected (Fig-
ures S3A–S3D), thereby mimicking the response of dopami-
nergic neurons (Schultz et al., 1997). In contrast to this, the early
fictive effect did not show significant influences by the expected
value and thus may mainly code whether or not outcomes were
Figure 2. Multiple Robust Regression Analysis of Feedback-Locked Epochs
(A) Regression b values for feedback-locked results for the predictor PE plotted separately for real (top panels) and fictive feedback. Occipital electrodes showed
the first significant effect only in the fictive condition (peak Oz 214ms, t30 =5.78, p < 105). A frontocentral-positive (peak at FCz 266ms, t30 = 5.17, p < 104) and
-negative (peak at FCz 382 ms, t30 = 8.70, p < 108) effect were present only in the real feedback condition. Both conditions showed later parietal covariations
that were opposed in sign (real peak at Pz 460 ms, t30 = 7.86, p < 107 and fictive peak at Pz 526 ms, t30 = 6.02, p < 105).
(B) In both feedback conditions, the learning rate showed a positive covariation with a centroparietal scalp distribution that peaked in a midlatency time window
around 376 ms (at Pz for chosen t30 = 8.38, p < 10
8 and for avoided t30 = 7.41, p < 10
7).
(C) The behavioral switch regressor yielded a peak at parietooccipital electrodes (at Pz for chosen at 408ms, t30 = 7.12, p < 10
6; for avoided at 420ms t30 = 5.67,
p < 105). Inverted triangles mark plots closest to peak amplitudes and nonsignificant (p > 0.00069) results are masked in white. See also Movie S1 for the whole
time course of the effects and Figure S2 for source localizations.
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favorable. Neither P3a nor later components showed a pattern
that satisfies criteria for an axiomatic PE signal (Caplin and
Dean, 2008), which is in line with other studies that found the
FRN to be the only cortical PE correlate in accordance with ax-
ioms of reward PEmodels (Talmi et al., 2012). Thus, the data sug-
gest that different cortical areas covary with PEs at different
times between 190–400 ms after feedback depending on
whether an outcome is directly experienced or fictive. Further-
more, the very early occipital PE correlate is mainly driven by
the favorability of the outcome itself and not the expected value,
suggesting a binary evaluation taking place here that may later
on be converted into more fine-scaled value updating.
Common Final Pathway
As feedback processing continues, the different streams appear
to converge on a common late parietal PE correlate that coin-
cides with the P3b ERP component (Polich, 2007). This PE
covariation was evident in both conditions with reversed
Figure 3. Comparison of Event-Related Potentials and Regression Results
(A) Grand average feedback-locked event-related potentials (ERPs) waveforms. Favorable (green) and unfavorable (red) outcomes are plotted separately for
chosen and avoided feedbacks at electrode FCz and POz. A clear FRN component can be seen for real and fictive feedback at FCz but is not modulated by the
valence of avoided feedback.
(B) Timewindows of significant effects for regressors used in the regression analysis. Positive covariations are depicted in blocks in red and negative covariations
in blue color. During the time window of the occipital early PE effect following fictive feedback, a negative deflection is present in the ERP waveform for fictive
unfavorable feedback. Learning rate (alpha) and switch effects span over longer time windows that do not simply represent one single ERP component. See
Figure S3 for a decomposition of the PE effects into contributing factors.
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polarities that were negative for real and positive for fictive feed-
back (significant from 392–650 ms for real and 414–590 ms for
fictive feedback, Figures 2B and 3B). Notably, this polarity
reversal results in the fact that unfavorable outcomes associated
with negative PEs in real and positive PEs in fictive conditions al-
ways lead to positive-going deviations of parietal EEG activity.
Thus, in order to compare the magnitude of the PE covariations,
we multiplied the fictive feedback condition by1 to account for
the PE sign reversal in relation to the outcome’s subjective
valence before contrasting both conditions (Figure 4B). This is
a logical consequence of the assumption that fictive feedback
in which unfavorable outcomes are associated with positive PE
signs engage counterfactual thinking. Contrasts did not show
differences between conditions in this late time window, which
indicates that real and fictive outcomes have similar effects on
P3b modulations, although absolute P3b amplitudes are
Figure 4. Time Courses of Regression Weights, Difference, and Conjunction Maps
(A) Time course of regression weights of the PE effects comparing processing of real (red) and fictive (blue) feedback, shown at electrodes of maximal effects of
early PE correlates (FCz and Oz). Thick lines, mean regression weights; shadows indicate the SEM. See Figures S4D–S4F for an across-subjects correlation of
regression weights with task performance.
(B) Difference-topography plots (fictive–real) in the time windows of the respective effects. Regression weights were collapsed over the effects’ duration and
average weights are plotted, while nonsignificant electrodes aremasked in white (p > 0.00069). For the late parietal effect, because it occurred in both conditions,
we also compared whether differences exist when the fictive condition was inverted (by multiplication with 1). This is based on the assumption that coun-
terfactual thinking was employed following fictive outcomes, converting them to favorable or unfavorable events. Note that when inverted, both conditions did not
differ significantly in the late P3b time window.
(C) Temporospatial conjunction map for regressors that showed effects in the late P3b time window in both real and fictive feedback conditions (learning rate, PE,
and behavioral switch). Plotted are minimum t-statistics of significant coactivation of all regressors (Nichols et al., 2005) collapsed over time. Midline electrodes
Pz and POz were significantly activated by all regressors in both conditions (see Figure S4 for details).
(D) Conjunction map for stimulus-locked SDC and feedback-locked PE and learning rate effects in both conditions between 370 and 650 ms. Parietal electrodes
were coactivated by feedback- and stimulus-locked P3b effects for SDC in the decision making phase and by parameters critical for value updating in the
feedback evaluation phase of the task.
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reduced following fictive feedback (Figure 3). This effect might
reflect the updating of stimulus-response mappings or, similarly,
of a stimulus’ expected value. Interestingly, an early theory of the
P3b suggested that it covaries with deviations from an adapta-
tion level (Ullsperger and Gille, 1988), a concept highly reminis-
cent of PEs, suggesting that the higher P3b is, the stronger the
necessary deviation from default behavior. In line with this, the
P3b amplitude was increased before a behavioral switch in a
reversal-learning task (Chase et al., 2011). The P3b has been
shown to correlate well with surprise (Mars et al., 2008), but sur-
prise alone is insufficient to explain the late EEG modulation and
behavioral switching in the present study: even when surprise
was included as a separate regressor, P3b still displayed signif-
icant covariation in both conditions with the outcome itself
(Figure S3). We thus suggest that the late parietal P3b effects
modulated by PE represent a common pathway for adaptation
based on the information extracted from the feedback. This
view is strongly supported by the finding that an additional
behavioral switch regressor (coding shift/stay behavior on next
encounters with the same stimulus, which happened on average
on the third following trial) covaries positively with midlatency
and late parietal EEG amplitudes (Figure 2C), thus remarkably
overlapping with the late PE effect in the temporal and spatial
domain. Given previous findings that higher P3b amplitudes
are associated with improved memory encoding (Fabiani et al.,
1990; Paller et al., 1987), it is conceivable that the parietal EEG
effects in the P3b time range reflect update and storage of the
stimulus value. Intriguingly, the PE correlate appears longer last-
ing than the switch effect, suggesting that the late portions of the
P3b may play further roles in addition to encoding the new stim-
ulus value, speculatively autonomic responses and awareness
(Wessel et al., 2011). In sum, the parietal P3b-like cortical activity
seems to set the stage for future decisions.
As seen in the behavioral data and supported by the reinforce-
ment learning model, with increasing learning success and thus
increasing certainty of reward likelihood, the impact of feedback
on value representations and overt behavioral adaptation de-
creases exponentially toward an asymptote. This is reflected in
a decreasing learning rate at, which, regressed against EEG
activity, yielded comparable sustained positive centroparietal
effects (significant at Pz from 192–562 ms for real and from
272–580 ms for fictive feedback; Figure 2B). The maximal
learning rate effect fell in between the early and the late PE
effects in both conditions, thereby modulating the baseline of
the FRN and the P3a and P3b amplitudes: the higher the learning
rate the more positive the EEG signal. As the learning rate de-
creases, the EEG amplitude decreases as well. We suggest
that this effect indeed represents the weighting of the outcome
in both conditions, causing less value updating and behavioral
adaptation in later trials within each block. This point is further
corroborated by the observation that those subjects whose
EEG signals more closely matched the reinforcement learning
models’ predictions made fewer bad decisions (Figures S4D–
S4F). Our finding that the learning rate determines the baseline
activity on which PE effects are modulated fits with fMRI results
demonstrating that PE coding in pMFC is modulated by individ-
ual learning rates (Behrens et al., 2007; Jocham et al., 2009).
Furthermore, it has been shown that functional connectivity of
feedback processing brain areas is reduced in late phases of
stable learning experiments (Klein et al., 2007).
Processing of Stimulus Information
When a stimulus value has been learned based on feedback, it
needs to be retrieved and used to guide choice at the next
encounter of the same stimulus. To investigate these processes,
we submitted stimulus-locked EEG epochs to a multiple robust
regression analysis. The signedQt regressor—reflecting the indi-
vidual’s single-trial stimulus value estimates—showed a signifi-
cant positive covariation at frontal electrodes 250–268 ms after
stimulus onset with peak values at electrode AFz (Figure 5).
Thus, stimuli with higher subjective values were associated
with more positive EEG activity. Value-related activity has
consistently been reported to correlate with activity of the
vmPFC (Jocham et al., 2012; Knutson et al., 2005; Plassmann
et al., 2010; Wunderlich et al., 2010). The anterior distribution
of this frontal value effect fits with an origin in vmPFC and its
timing is supported by a recent study reporting vmPFC magne-
toencephalic correlates of overall value when different stimuli
were presented simultaneously (Hunt et al., 2012) and single-
neuron activity in dlPFC and OFC in monkeys (Hayden et al.,
2009). The translation of this value representation into action is
indirect as indicated by an inverse relationship between EEG
amplitude and reaction time for choosing compared to avoiding
a stimulus (Figure S5A). This EEG modulation reflects the intui-
tive observation that Q values deviating further from 0 are asso-
ciated with easier and quicker decisions about which option to
choose (Figure S1A). In other words, choice reaction time is
driven rather by the certainty of the stimulus value than by the
value representation and its early EEG correlate.
Following this early covariation with signed value, a prominent
effect of subjective decision certainty (SDC) about which
response to give was seen. Values for SDC were derived from
the likelihood of the computational model to select one response
over the other and rectified in order to range frommaximal uncer-
tainty (0) to absolute preference of one option (1) (see Experi-
mental Procedures for details). SDC demonstrated clear positive
covariance with EEG activity in a centroparietal scalp distribu-
tion, peaking at around 520 ms following stimulus onset (signifi-
cant from 456–744 ms, Figure 5), which is close to median
response time (539 ms). Therefore, response certainty was re-
flected by more positive single-trial parietal EEG activity at a
much later time point than the frontal value effects. The timing
of the observed covariation fits well to the latency of the stim-
ulus-related P3b ERP component. This pattern of increased
P3b with response certainty rules out an explanation of novelty
or surprise, as newly occurring stimuli always lead to SDC values
of zero. Note that since RTs were included as a separate regres-
sor in the multiple regression, neither the SDC nor the Q value
effect can be explained by an earlier onset of preparatory motor
activity (Figures S5A and S5C).
Predicting Future Adaptations
Our analysis enabled us to study the entire time course of cortical
processes underlying decision making, outcome evaluation, and
learning (i.e., updating) value representations. Upon stimulus
presentation, retrieval of learnt values activates cortical value
Neuron
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representations reflected in early midfrontal EEG activity. Deci-
sion certainty is reflected in P3b-like parietal EEG activity around
response latency, and mapping of the selected action to the
motor response is reflected in lateralized activity from (pre)motor
cortices (Figure S5C). After feedback, initially outcomes are pro-
cessed separately depending on whether their consequences
are real or fictive, presumably in order to convert feedback infor-
mation into a common value currency allowing for efficient
learning of stimulus values. Then the information about neces-
sary value updates converges on common parietal P3b-like
activity modulated by whether the action was successful or
not. Given the probabilistic nature of the instrumental learning
task, several parameters need to be used to weight the impact
of single-trial outcomes. Over the course of multiple trials,
learning rate indicates the learning success and downweights
the single-feedback information at later learning stages. More-
over, when a choice is made with high certainty, perseveration
of this behavior is favorable. This means that already at the
Figure 5. Stimulus-Locked Regression Results
(A) Top row: signed Q value showed a significant positive covariation at frontal electrodes (peak at Fz at 264 ms, t30 = 4.06, p < 0.0005, significant from 250 to
268 ms), lateralized to the left hemiscalp (AF3, F3/5, FC3). The scalp signal here was associated with reaction times in a condition-dependent manner (Fig-
ure S5B). Bottom row: results for the subjective decision certainty (SDC) regressor showed a positive mediocentral effect (peak at Cz at 520 ms, t30 = 7.71, p <
107, significant from 456 to 744 ms). As SDC is higher when subjects are more certain about the response to give (for both good and bad stimuli), these results
imply increased stimulus P3b amplitudes after subjects established reasonable certainty about expected values and thus the optimal response. This effect is
independent of whether or not the stimulus was estimated to be good or bad as in this time window no effect of the SQV was observed.
(B) Corresponding time courses of regression weights. SQV and SDC at the two electrodes of their respective peak values (AFz and Cz) are shown. Thick lines,
mean regression weights; shadows indicate the SEM. The vertical dashed line represents the group median reaction time (539 ± 16 ms) in both plots.
Nonsignificant (p > 0.00044) time points in the topography plots are masked in white. See also Figure S5C for response-locked results.
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time of the response (and thus before feedback), high certainty
might be used to strengthen the current value representation,
thereby shielding it from potentially misleading feedback. Inter-
estingly, the stimulus- and feedback-locked late parietal P3b-
like activity is consistent with the notion of certainty- and
learning-rate-weighted value strengthening and updates at
different time points: high response certainty, which should be
associated with re-encoding (strengthening) of the stimulus
value to assure perseveration, is associated with high stimulus-
locked P3b amplitudes. In contrast, after feedback, high learning
rates and unfavorable outcomes commonly give rise to high
feedback-locked P3b amplitudes, presumably reflecting value
updating and storage, thereby increasing the likelihood to
change future choice behavior. To put it briefly, lower stimulus-
related P3b and higher feedback-related P3b amplitudes should
be associated with an increased likelihood to switch choice on
the next encounter with the same stimulus.
This notion that feedback- and stimulus-related P3b ampli-
tudes are inversely related to switch behavior was tested at
electrode Pz, which was identified via a conjunction analysis of
all relevant stimulus- and feedback-locked effects in the P3b
time window (Figure 4D). A discrimination threshold was itera-
tively estimated in one half of randomly chosen trials that was
then used to predict switching in the second half of trials. This
very simple algorithm predicted switches significantly above
chance level, namely with average accuracy of 56.75% ±
1.18% (t30 = 5.67, p < 10
5) following real outcomes and
55.86%± 0.72% (t30 = 8.26, p < 10
8) following fictive outcomes.
When this algorithm was applied to the stimulus-related P3b,
switches were predicted correctly with average accuracy of
53.17% ± 0.78% (t30 = 4.04, p = 0.0003) before choosing and
53.36% ± 0.77% (t30 = 4.34, p = 0.0001) before avoiding the
stimulus. Note that the purpose of this analysis was not to predict
future behavior as accurately as possible but to demonstrate that
thewhole-brain regression reliably identified electrodes and time
windows of importance for studying learning and decision
making and that switches still refer to the next time the stimulus
is shown again. Importantly, it was indeed the case that switches
were predicted by increased feedback-related but decreased
stimulus-related P3b amplitudes (see Experimental Procedures
for details). This result demonstrates that simple attentional ef-
fects cannot account for the P3b effects: a global decrease of
attention should lower stimulus- and feedback-related P3b am-
plitudes (Polich, 2007) and adaptive switches in parallel, which is
inconsistent with our findings. To compare the importance of
both factors in predicting future adaptations, we used logistic
regression on the switch behavior to determine the contributions
of stimulus and feedback P3b. When let to compete for variance,
feedback P3b was the better indicator of behavioral adaptation
(p = 0.035 for chosen and p = 0.028 for avoided stimuli, two-
sided t test of standardized regression weights), but both feed-
back and stimulus P3b had a significant effect (all p < 0.01). As
is intuitively plausible, the actual feedback ismore closely related
to adaptation but already before feedback is presented, predic-
tions about behavioral adaptation based solely on stimulus
values are possible. Thus, with the mere knowledge of a short in-
terval of raw stimulus- or feedback-related EEG at Pz and current
behavior, predictions of future behavior can be made.
This strengthens the interpretation of feedback P3b represent-
ing value updating, as P3b in both stages of decision making
alludes to value coding and behavioral adaptation. It is tempting
to assume that both processes are related and that, in case of
high certainty, already before feedback is given the stimulus
value is encoded. Although similarity in both processes is sug-
gested by the conjunction analysis, these EEG results have to
be interpreted cautiously as different generators may give rise
to similar scalp topographies. The reversal of the relationship
between P3b amplitudes and switch behavior, however, hints
to a more specific mechanism than a mere reduction of attention
or simple surprise. It therefore seems to be the case that PE
correlates, processed in different cortical areas for real and
fictive outcomes, modified by a weighting process, serve as
the basis for, and precede the timing of, future decisions. After
being exposed to an updated stimulus again, P3b covaries
with the security of the selected action, possibly preventing
switching away from a learned stimulus.
Being able to adapt behavior based on purely fictive events
through counterfactual thinking may be a human ability that
allows learning from abstract information in the absence of any
actor. Our results demonstrate through the whole time course
of decision making, from value retrieval following stimulus pre-
sentation and its translation into action selection until the updat-
ing of these values following feedback, how real and fictive
events can be utilized to enable adaptive behavior. Localization
and timing of these fictive error signals suggest a distinct func-
tion that may have evolved by recruiting different cortical mech-
anisms than experiencing or observing real outcomes caused by
an actor. The adaptation itself, however, seems to be based on a
more general mechanism that can be employed by experienced
and fictive outcomes.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Participants
Thirty-one healthy subjects (21 female, mean age: 23.81 ± 0.61) participated in
a pharmacological study and each provided written informed consent. We
report here on data from the placebo session. The study was approved by
the ethics committee of the Medical Faculty of the University of Cologne
(Cologne, Germany).
Task Description
Subjects had to learn the associated reward probabilities of different stimuli in
order tomaximize their financial earnings in a probabilistic choice task. At each
trial, subjects were presented with one stimulus where they had two options:
they could either choose the stimulus and risk winning or losingV0.10 or avoid
the stimulus and observe the outcome without financial consequences. The
fictive feedback provided information about what would have happened if
they had chosen that stimulus (fictive outcome). Subjects were informed that
they would receive the money won in the task at the end of the session as a
bonus to their expense allowance. The task was presented using Presentation
10.3 (Neurobehavioral Systems).
The experiment consisted of four blocks with a random series of three
different stimuli, totaling 12 different stimuli over the time of the experiment.
Four stimuli associated with high chances of reward (good stimuli, two with
80% and two with 70% win rate), four stimuli associated with low chances
of reward (bad stimuli, with 20% and 30% win rate), and four stimuli with a
random chance of winning (neutral stimuli, 50% win rate) were presented 50
times each and then replaced. Win rates and symbol sequences were pseu-
dorandomized. There were no pauses during the experiment, and trials in
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which subjects failed to respond within the given deadline were discarded
from analysis. In the last block of the experiment, until each stimulus had
been shown 50 times, additional new filler stimuli were shown but not included
in the analyses so that every subject concluded exactly 600 valid trials.
Each trial began with a central fixation cross that was shown for a random
period between 300 and 700 ms accompanied by the two response options:
choose (indicated by a green tick mark) and avoid (indicated by a red no park-
ing sign, Figure 1A). The response options remained in place until feedback
was shown and their sides were counterbalanced across subjects. After the
fixation cross, one central stimulus consisting of drawn animal pictures inwhite
on a black background was presented until the subject responded or 1,700ms
had elapsed. If subjects failed to respond in time, a message appeared asking
them to respond faster. Subjects’ choices were confirmed by awhite rectangle
surrounding the chosen option for 350 ms. Immediately thereafter, the
outcome was presented for 750 ms depending on the subjects’ choice. If sub-
jects bet money, they received either a green smiling face and a reward of
V0.10 or a red frowning face and a loss of V0.10. When subjects did not bet
on a symbol, they received the same feedback but with a slightly paler color
and the money that could have been received was crossed out to indicate
that the feedback was fictive and had no monetary effect. Stimuli were kept
as similar as possible between conditions to avoid introducing effects of stim-
ulus salience. On average, subjects gained V6.36 ± V0.51 (range V0.50–
V9.50) over the course of the experiment.
EEG Data Acquisition and Analysis
Scalp voltageswere recordedwith 60 Ag/AgCl sintered electrodes frompartic-
ipants seated in a dimly lit electromagnetically and acoustically shielded cham-
ber. Electrodesweremounted inanelastic cap (Easycap) in theextended10-20
system with impedances kept below 5 kU. The ground electrode was posi-
tioned at F2 and datawere online referenced to electrodeCPz. Eyemovements
were captured by electrodes positioned at the left and right outer canthus and
above and below the left eye, respectively. EEG data were registered continu-
ously at 500 Hz sampling frequency with BrainAmp MR plus amplifiers (Brain
Products). Data were then offline analyzed using EEGLAB 7.2 (Delorme and
Makeig, 2004) and custom routines in MATLAB 7.8 (MathWorks). After filtering
the signal from 0.5 to 52 Hz and rereferencing to common average reference,
epochs spanning from 1.5 s before to 1.5 s after feedback and 1 s before
to 1 s after stimulus onset were generated. Epochs containing deviations
greater than 5 SD of the mean probability distribution on any single channel
or the whole montage were automatically rejected. Epoched data were then
submitted to temporal infomax independent component analysis (ICA) inte-
grated in EEGLAB and manually corrected for artifacts such as eye blinks.
Hereafter, data were re-epoched to extract response-locked data with epochs
spanning from 500 ms before until 100 ms after the response. The average
EEG activity spanning from250 to50ms before stimulus and feedback pre-
sentation and 500 to 400 ms before response onset was used as baseline
andsubtracted fromeachchannel individually (seeSupplemental Experimental
Procedures for additional results of the stimulus- and response-locked data).
Computational Model
We used a reinforcement Q-learning algorithm to model each subject’s
sequence of choices (Sutton and Barto, 1998), which has been successfully
adopted in reinforcement-learning paradigms (e.g., Jocham et al., 2009). For
each stimulus and trial t, the model estimated the expected stimulus value
Qt based on that stimulus’ previous reward and choice history. Q values repre-
sent the expected reward (positive values) or punishment (negative values) and
are updated according to the following rule:
Qt + 1 =

Qt +ac; tdt if chosen
Qt +aa; tdt if avoided
: (1)
dt represents the PE of the given trial, calculated as the difference betweenQ
value and reward magnitude (Rt):
dt =
Rt Qt
2
: (2)
To update the Q value in Equation (1), we scaled the amplitude of dt by expo-
nentially decreasing learning rates ac,t and aa,t, respectively, depending on
whether the subject had chosen or avoided the stimulus. This allowed assess-
ment of differences in learning rates and behavioral flexibility on both condi-
tions separately. The exponential decay was calculated by two half-life time
parameters (Hlc/a) depending on the subject’s choice:
ac; t =
ac; 1
2ðt1HlcÞ
and aa; t =
aa; 1
2ðt1HlaÞ
: (3)
ac,1 and aa,1 denote the two free parameters representing the initial learning
rate in both conditions. A lower limit for ac,t and aa,t was set to 0.01, under
which learning rates could not decrease. Note that our model additionally con-
tained a constant learning rate (Hlc/a =N) as part of the range of parameters in
the fitted parameter set to account for the possibility of a time invariant learning
rate.
The likelihood of the model to choose or avoid a given stimulus was calcu-
lated by the softmax rule of the associated Q value (Figure 1B):
Pc; t =
1
1+ expðQtbÞ and Pa; t = 1 Pc; t: (4)
The free sensitivity parameter b can be regarded as the inverted temperature
(high values lead to predictable behavior and vice versa). For the first step, we
determined parameter estimates for all five free parameters using a grid search
minimizing LL over all trials T:
nLL=
XT
t =1
log PðctjqÞ: (5)
P(ctj.) denotes the models’ probability to choose in the same way as the
subject did in each trial given the parameter-set theta. To determine reasonable
parameter combinations, we applied the following constraints: ac/a,1 R 0.01
and % 1, Hlc/a R 1 and % 100 but separately including N and b R 0.01
and% 25 and step sizes for bwere logarithmized. The logarithmization reflects
the assumption that the model is more strongly affected by differences at small
b values. Second, the best-fitting parameter combination was then used as the
starting point for a nonlinear optimization algorithm (fmincon, MATLAB optimi-
zation toolbox). Constraints for ac,1 and aa,1 were kept but no upper limits for
b andHlc/a set. To obtain single-trial estimates of dt,Qt, and ac/a,t, we re-entered
theMLEparametersac/a,t,HIc/a, andb into the reinforcement-learningalgorithm.
Model Fit and Parameters
The parameter combinations that led to the best fit were not significantly
different between both conditions (Table 1). Best fits were obtained for slightly
higher average initial learning rates in condition choose (ac,1 = 0.48 ± 0.07) than
in avoid (aa,1 = 0.42 ± 0.07), which decreased slightly more rapidly (Hlc = 9.78 ±
2.60 and Hla = 13.47 ± 3.30). For one subject, the best fit was obtained with a
constant learning rate (defined as a half-life time >100 trials, which equals less
than 30% decrease per block) in condition choose and for four subjects in
condition avoid. On average, learning rates decreased to 3% of their initial
values in condition choose and to 8% in condition avoid, providing strong sup-
port for the assumption that the impact of PEs is reduced over time. To
compare both learning rates between conditions, we conducted a repeated-
measures ANOVA with factors at (50) and condition (2) that showed no signif-
icant main effect of condition on the decaying learning rate (condition F1,30 =
0.26, p = 0.613) and no interaction (condition x at F1.8,54 = 0.553, p = 0.561).
Although we fit different sets of model parameters for both conditions (real
and fictive), we did not account for possible differences in learning caused
by the different reward contingencies. It is likely that this would influence the
results for parameter MLE, especially for the decaying learning rate. Notably,
we did not observe a significant feedback-locked effect for the decaying
learning rate when analysis was restricted to neutral stimuli alone, indicating
that here no downweighting of the PEs in later trials occurred (see Supple-
mental Experimental Procedures). However, we feel that fitting parameters
separately, even for different reward contingencies, would lead to overfitting
and expand parameter space to unmanageable dimensions.
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Multiple Single-Trial Robust Regression
To account for differences in the sensitivity parameter, Z scored results of the
reinforcement-learning model were used to build a general linear model (GLM)
and regress single-trial EEG activity at each electrode and time point against
model predictions and behavioral parameters. Robust regression that down-
weights outliers by performing an iteratively reweighted least square method
(O’Leary, 1990) was employed to determine parameters in the following linear
equation: Y = intercept + b1Reg1 + b2Reg2 ... + error.
Similar approaches have been successfully applied to EEG time- (Rousselet
et al., 2008) and frequency-domain (Cohen and Cavanagh, 2011) data and
allow the simultaneous investigation of multiple independent variables while
preserving the high temporal resolution of the EEG. This mass univariate
approach leads to individual b values for each electrode and time point for
every subject. To ensure comparability between predictors within and be-
tween subjects and to penalize the model in case of multicollinearity of predic-
tors, b values were standardized by their SDs before averaging across
subjects.
The stimulus-lockedGLM included variable learning-rate (at), signedQ value
(sQt), and subjective decision certainty (SDC) plus the reaction time (RT) as a
regressor of no interest. SDC was calculated from the models’ softmax likeli-
hood by equalizingPc/a for choosing and avoiding using the following equation:
SDC = abs(Pc/a  0.5) 3 2. The result ranged from 0 (maximal insecurity) to 1
(absolute preference of one option). Feedback-locked data were analyzed
separately for the categorical conditions fictive and real. Predictors included
the PE (dt), variable learning rate (at), and a dichotomous regressor indicating
a switch of response (coded as 1) or a stay (coded as 0) on the next trial that the
same stimulus was shown again.
Standardized b values can be assumed to be Gaussian due to the central
limit theorem and thus could be tested via two-tailed one-sample t tests, which
were done separately at each data point in a whole-brain approach across
subjects. Resulting p values were corrected for multiple comparisons using
false discovery rate (FDR) following the method suggested by Benjamini and
Yekutieli (2001), which has been shown to provide solid control of the fam-
ily-wise error rate (FWER) in EEG data (Groppe et al., 2011). However, as
FDR in itself does not provide strong (local) control of the FWER, it was applied
to all concatenated b value data sets per model. This ensured that all correc-
tions were done with the same threshold value for each regressor in the
models. H0 was rejected for all p < 0.00070 in the feedback and p < 0.00045
in the stimulus-locked model. Nonsignificant data points are masked in white
in the topography plots and Movie S1. Both conditions in the feedback-locked
epochs were contrasted via paired two-tailed t tests thresholded at the same
level as noted above.
Direct Contrasts between Real and Fictive Feedback Evaluation
We compared both real and fictive feedback processing directly via paired
two-sided t tests of the regression b values, thresholded at the same level
determined by FDR. This revealed that feedback processing indeed differed
significantly for all PE effects. The late parietal effect did not differ significantly
when it was inverted for fictive feedbacks, assuming that counterfactual
thinking was employed (by multiplication with 1) before contrasting. Con-
trasts for alpha and switch regressors did not reveal significant differences be-
tween both conditions.
Prediction of Choice Switches Based on Artifact-free Raw EEG
Artifact-free raw EEG was averaged from 370 to 430 ms at electrode (Pz) that
showed the biggest overlap between effects of the switch, PE, and learning
rate predictors in the regression analysis (Figures 4C, 4D, and S4) and SDC
effects locked to stimulus onset. As we observed a positive covariation in the
regression analysis for switching behavior, we hypothesized that higher EEG
amplitudes should be associated with a higher likelihood to switch. Addition-
ally, because the absolute EEG amplitudes differed between both conditions
(Figure 3), the analyses for real and fictive feedbackwere performed separately.
For each subject, equally sized samples were randomly drawn from both
conditions and split into two halves. One half was used to determine a discrim-
ination threshold calculated as the simple arithmetic mean between the distri-
butions of amplitudes for switches and stays. The predictions of this threshold
were then tested in the other half of trials. One hundred iterations were per-
formed, and the results were averaged and tested against chance (i.e., 50%
correct predictions) on group level using two-tailed one-sample t tests.
Average amplitudes in the defined time window before switches were 6.29 ±
0.71 mV and 4.03 ± 0.62 mV before stays following chosen and 4.00 ± 0.61 mV
before switches and 1.78 ± 0.53 mV before stays following fictive feedback.
Predictions were equally valid in both conditions: the simple discrimination al-
gorithm predicted switches correctly on an average of 56.75% ± 1.18% (t30 =
5.67, p < 105) for real feedback and 55.86% ± 0.72% (t30 = 8.26, p < 10
8) for
fictive feedback (t30 = 0.68, p = 0.49 for difference in accuracy between con-
ditions). In the real feedback condition out of the 31 participants, 27 had a pre-
diction chance >50%and 17 >55% (maximum 70.88%). In the fictive feedback
condition, 29 had a prediction chance >50% and 17 >55% (maximum
65.76%). Results remained significant when only neutral, good, or bad stimuli
were analyzed (always p < 0.01).
The same analysis was performed for stimulus-locked data, again sepa-
rately for upcoming choose or avoid decisions to keep the results comparable
with the feedback locked analysis. Average P3b amplitudes (from 520 to
580 ms, measured at Pz) before choosing were 4.81 ± 0.41 mV and 5.77 ±
0.48 mV for stimuli that lead to switches and stays, respectively. Before avoid-
ing, average amplitudes were 4.78 ± 0.46 mV before switches and 5.99 ±
0.46 mV for stimuli that lead to switches and stays, respectively. Switches
were predicted correctly on an average of 53.17% ± 0.78% (t30 = 4.04, p =
0.0003) for real feedback and 53.36% ± 0.77% (t30 = 4.34, p = 0.0001) for
fictive feedback. Before choosing out of the 31 participants, 24 had a predic-
tion chance >50% and 8 >55% (maximum 61.38%) and before avoiding 26
had a prediction chance >50% and 11 >55% (maximum 61.62%). Results re-
mained significant when only good or bad stimuli were analyzed in both con-
ditions (always p < 0.01) but not when only neutral stimuli were analyzed (both
p > 0.39). The latter has to be expected as it is implausible that it would be
possible to predict future adaptations for random outcomes if these affect
switching. No differences were seen in the latency of the grand-average
peak of the stimulus P3b amplitudes depending on high or low expected
values or on following choices (ANOVA choice (choose/avoid) 3 value (high/
low) p always > 0.1).
Logistic regression of switch behavior against stimulus and feedback P3b
amplitudes was used to compare their respective predictive powers. Stan-
dardized b values for choices were 1.7 ± 0.26 (t30 = 6.55, p < 10
6) for feedback
and 0.66 ± 0.22 (t30 = 3.05, p = 0.005) for stimulus P3b amplitudes. For
avoided trials, b values were 1.72 ± 0.20 (t30 = 8.59, p < 10
8) for feedback
and 0.79 ± 0.23 (t30 = 3.45, p = 0.0016) for stimulus P3b amplitudes.
Note the sign reversal of regression weights for stimulus and feedback P3b
in relation to switch behavior. Combining feedback- and stimulus-locked
P3b amplitudes did not increase prediction accuracy for the logistic regression
asmeasured by comparing summedLL via likelihood-ratio tests between the
model with only feedback P3b and the combined model (both p > 0.59).
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